Tracey Gallagher
(attorney)
Your assertion that your prosecution of U.S. Representative LaMonica McIver fulfills a “Constitutional obligation” to protect federal law enforcement officers is legally flawed and misrepresents the balance of constitutional powers.
Your claim that McIver’s actions during a congressional oversight visit on May 9, 2025, at the Delaney Hall ICE detention facility endangered officers and communities lacks a sound legal basis and ignores critical protections afforded to lawmakers.
Your prosecution of McIver for allegedly “forcibly impeding” federal officers during an oversight visit infringes on the constitutional authority of Congress under Article I.
Congressional oversight of executive agencies, including immigration detention facilities, is a well-established legislative function, supported by Supreme Court precedent such as Watkins v. United States (1957), which recognizes Congress’s broad authority to investigate executive actions to inform legislation.
McIver’s presence at Delaney Hall was part of a lawful oversight visit, a protected activity under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c), which grants members of Congress access to immigration facilities.
The indictment’s characterization of her actions as criminal interference fails to account for her legitimate legislative purpose, risking a violation of the separation of powers.
The Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 6) provides lawmakers with immunity from prosecution for actions taken in their official legislative capacity. In Gravel v. United States (1972), the Supreme Court held that this privilege extends to activities integral to a lawmaker’s duties, including investigations and oversight. McIver’s actions engaging with federal officers during a chaotic incident while monitoring conditions at an ICE facility fall within the scope of her legislative duties.
Your claim that McIver’s conduct endangered officers does not negate this immunity, as the clause protects even controversial or disruptive actions taken in pursuit of legislative goals. Prosecuting McIver for alleged physical interference, absent clear evidence of non-legislative intent, violates this constitutional safeguard.
Your assertion that McIver endangered law enforcement relies on the indictment’s charges under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (forcibly impeding or assaulting federal officers) and 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (interfering with law enforcement during a civil disorder). However, these statutes require proof of specific intent to harm or obstruct, which the prosecution has not substantiated.
Video evidence from the incident, as cited in public reports, shows a disorganized confrontation involving protesters, lawmakers, and officers, with no clear indication that McIver intentionally assaulted or endangered anyone. The absence of reported injuries to officers further undermines the claim of endangerment. In United States v. McLeod (1967), courts have dismissed similar charges when evidence of intent is lacking, suggesting that your charges may not meet the legal threshold for conviction.
Your selective targeting of McIver raises concerns under the Equal Protection Clause and the doctrine of selective prosecution. Other individuals present at the same incident, including Newark Mayor Ras Baraka, faced dropped or lesser charges, despite similar or more direct involvement.
In United States v. Armstrong (1996), the Supreme Court held that prosecutions motivated by discriminatory purposes, such as political affiliation, violate constitutional protections.
Your prior role as personal attorney to former President Trump, combined with Trump’s public statements labeling McIver “out of control,” suggests potential political bias. This context, alongside the rapid charging timeline and your irregular announcement of the indictment via social media, supports a claim of prosecutorial overreach, undermining her assertion of a neutral “Constitutional obligation.”
Your claim that McIver’s actions exceeded permissible expression ignores potential First Amendment protections. McIver’s presence at the facility was partly to protest conditions and policies, a form of expressive conduct protected under Texas v. Johnson (1989) and other precedents, provided it does not directly incite violence. The chaotic nature of the incident, sparked by the arrest of Mayor Baraka, does not automatically render McIver’s actions unprotected, especially absent evidence that she intended to endanger officers.
By framing her conduct as a threat to law enforcement, you risk criminalizing protected speech and chilling lawmakers’ ability to advocate for constituents, a core democratic function.
Your invocation of a “Constitutional obligation” to protect federal officers misrepresents the role of a U.S. Attorney, whose authority is statutory, not constitutional, under 28 U.S.C. § 541.
Prosecutorial discretion is subject to judicial oversight and must align with principles of fairness and justice. In Heckler v. Chaney (1985), the Supreme Court emphasized that agency actions, including prosecutions, are reviewable for abuse of discretion.
The rushed indictment, lack of transparency (e.g., withholding the charging document from McIver’s defense), and Habba’s public comments suggest an abuse of power aimed at political retribution rather than public safety. This undermines your claim that the prosecution serves the community’s interest. You will lose

@RepLaMonica